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Introduction
Since the publication in 1989 of John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power,1
much has been written about the British fiscal–military state in the
eighteenth century.2 However, the vast majority of this literature con-
cludes with the American War of Independence and does not exam-
ine the period of the Great Wars (1793–1815). This is a major omis-
sion; the Great Wars, in many ways, saw the fiscal–military state at
its greatest extent. The three branches of the armed forces, the army,
the navy, and the Ordnance, all saw their budgets grow to previous-
ly unthought-of levels. The National Debt also increased to levels
never seen before. This essay examines one of the many characteris-
tics of the fiscal–military state, namely, the relationship between the
state and its private contractors. It will focus on the Office of Ord -
nance and gunpowder manufacturers, although in order to context -
ualize this relationship it will also touch on other Ordnance–private
relations in the period. Iron ordnance and gun carriages will be men-
tioned in this context. This essay will show that during the Great
Wars, the Ordnance became increasingly less reliant on private gun-
powder manufacturers as it increased state production. However, the
increases in state manufacture should not be overstated. Only in cer-
tain articles did the Ordnance develop its own resources; the vast
majority used by the armed forces in the Great Wars were manufac-
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tured by the private sector. These other stores will also be mentioned
in order to contextualize the story of the powder merchants. As part
of this discussion, the contracting system within the Ordnance will be
briefly discussed. In addition, the reaction of the merchants to the
end of the wars will be examined.
During the Great Wars of 1793 to 1815 the Office of Ordnance was
re spon sible for supplying the armed forces with all their weaponry
and associated stores. This essay will show that throughout the con-
flicts, the Ordnance successfully managed the task of keeping the
merchant suppliers content (if not happy) and keeping up a steady
supply of increasingly higher quality powder to the navy (and army,
but this will not be discussed in this essay).
As stated, the Office of Ordnance was responsible for supplying
the armed forces with, among many other articles, gunpowder. In
order to understand the various relationships, an understanding of
the structure and organization of the Ordnance itself is needed. The
Office was headed by the Master-General, a senior general who, in the
period under discussion, was also in the Cabinet. However, he was
rarely, if ever, involved in the contracting process, most of his time
being taken up by his commitments as colonel-in-chief of the Royal
Artillery and Royal Engineers. The contracting was, in fact, over seen
by the Board of Ordnance which consisted of the Lieutenant General,
the Surveyor General, the Clerk of the Ordnance, the Principal Store -
keeper, and the Clerk of Deliveries. Any three of these could form a
Board. Here we see a division of responsibility in the Ordnance hier-
archy between the military side and the civil side. This essay, al -
though it discusses military stores, actually examines the role of the
civil organization of the Ordnance. 
Each of the Principal Officers also ran their own sub-office. Of
these, the Office of the Surveyor General was the most important for
this essay because it was here that all the Ordnance Bills and deben-
tures were examined and passed for payment. Indeed, James
Hadden, Surveyor General between 1804 and 1810, while giving evi-
dence to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry stated that he saw
himself as ‘taking a very considerable lead’ amongst the principal
officers in the handling of contracts ‘from the knowledge which I am
naturally supposed to have acquired from my perusal of the Bills’.3
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However, the role of the Surveyor General did change with the per-
sonality of the incumbent. Hadden was clearly a conscientious officer
who committed to the position and he stopped all his regimental
duties as a Royal Artillery officer. In contrast, the first Surveyor
General of the Wars, George Berkeley, did not give up his naval
career. At the time, he was a captain in the Royal Navy and concur-
rently with holding his Ordnance position also commanded HMS
Marlborough, a 74-gun ship, in the Channel Fleet. In fact, he was badly
wounded on board at the Glorious First of June. Berkeley could not
have been as efficient and as knowledgeable as Hadden when it came
to contracts and Ordnance Bills.
In addition to these men, the most important figure in the supply
of powder was the Comptroller of the Royal Laboratory. Only two
men held this position during the wars, Sir William Congreve the
Elder and his son, Sir William Congreve the Younger. These men
reported to the Board, not to the Master-General. The Congreves are
important in the story because after 1802 the Comptroller was in
charge of all aspects of powder supply. The autonomy afforded to
these men must be emphasized because just as Hadden saw himself
as the senior official expert on contracts, the Congreves can be seen
as the Ordnance officials’ experts on gunpowder.
Although not nearly as well known, it is necessary to mention in
passing the numerous clerks and junior officials who also con-
tributed to the successful supply of powder to the armed forces dur-
ing the wars. It is these unsung men who made up the contracts,
ledgers, and so on, and became a permanent administrative service
supporting the work of the Ordnance.
The lack of records means that less is known about the other side
of the network being examined, the private gunpowder manufactur-
ers. Jenny West’s book, Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-
Eighteenth Century gives an overview of the people and personalities
involved up to the Great Wars.4 Little can be added to this account.
However, it is necessary to note that the number of manufacturers
was comparatively small because of the complexity of powder man-
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ufacture and the capital investment needed to keep a mill working,
especially during peacetime. This will be examined in more detail
below. West writes that only ten mills supplied the Ordnance with
powder during the Seven Years War. Current research has shown
that there were five main suppliers at the start of the Great Wars; by
1813 this figure had risen to eight. Thus there were few suppliers,
and this contributed to some of the problems and discussions that
will be mentioned below. As far as major stores were concerned, this
number of contractors was not small. The number of iron ordnance
manufacturers can also be counted on the fingers of one hand, the
main ones being Walkers and Carron.
Gunpowder Ingredients and their Sources
Gunpowder itself is made up of three constituent parts: saltpetre, sul-
phur, and charcoal. Saltpetre was imported from India by the East
India Company; sulphur was imported mainly from Sicily and south-
ern Italy; and only charcoal was sourced from the British Isles. Thus
imperial trade links were important. If these had broken down, the
British war effort would have been severely hindered. This point
should not be underemphasized. During his tenure as Master-
General, the Duke of Richmond ordered the building of a warehouse
to store sulphur in case trade links were broken by hostile activity.
These links also show the importance of the private sector to the
state sector and the networks that were involved within this. The
Ordnance did not own any vessels capable of transporting either sul-
phur or saltpetre over the long distances necessary to import them.
These all had to be contracted out. As mentioned, the saltpetre was
brought to Britain in the hulls of East Indiamen; sulphur was brought
by other private merchants. Unfortunately, little is known about the
workings of the trade from Sicily, but this is worthy of a full study in
itself. If the links from the Mediterranean had broken down, the pro-
duction of powder would have been severely hampered. Fortunately,
the navy was forced from the Mediterranean only for a very short
period between 1796 and 1798. Figure 11.1 shows the small amount
of sulphur imported in 1797 following this withdrawal. 
As a comparison, in 1792 (a year of peace) just over 51,000 cwt of
sulphur was imported, of which 48,243 came from Italy. By 1807 the
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imports were approximately 86,500 cwt (60,000 from Italy and 26,000
from Malta). The importance of the Mediterranean supply routes is
therefore obvious. Comparative figures for saltpetre have not been
included because almost the entire supply was carried by the East
India Company. Once the raw materials had arrived in the country,
the Ordnance sent the merchants saltpetre on payment of a deposit,
but they were expected to procure the sulphur and charcoal them-
selves, once contracts had been signed.
As regards supply, the situation in France was very different.
Charcoal and sulphur were easily available, the sulphur coming from
Italy. However, saltpetre was harder for the French to obtain. With
the loss of their Indian colonies in the wars of the eighteenth century,
they did not have access to the same supplies of saltpetre as the
British. This led to a number of supply problems, described by Robert
Multhauf.5 The importance of the imperial trade links and networks
cannot be overstated when it comes to gunpowder supply. This small
case study is further evidence of the usefulness of the empire to Brit -
ain in its wars against the French.
The Contracting System
One of the most important aspects in the links between the state and
the private sector was the contracting process. Without this the whole
supply system might have collapsed, or the state would have had to
pay more for the same services. The historian of the Ordnance and its
links with the private sector is fortunate that the Commissioners of
Military Enquiry reported on the Ordnance in their twelfth to seven-
teenth reports between 1810 and 1812. These provide valuable infor-
mation about the workings and organization of the Office, especially
in the process of contracting.
By the period under discussion, all Ordnance stores and articles
with the exception of local shipping and stores which were state
manu factured were tendered out. The tendering process was
straight forward. For the vast majority of stores, an advertisement
was placed asking for tenders to be sent to the Office by a particular
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date.6 When asked by the Commissioners whether ‘[it is] required
that the parties should attend, and deliver in their Tenders at the
same time?’ Robert Crew, Secretary to the Board, answered in the
positive. He then opened the tenders in the presence of the Board
and, ‘if from a responsible person’, the lowest tender was generally
accepted. The contracts which were entered into would usually be for
three years, ‘determinable at the expiration of one, by a notice of
three months from either party’.7 These contracts were for a period of
time and not for specific quantities. Gunpowder (and iron ordnance)
was different. The contracts entered into in this case were for a spe-
cific amount.
The reasons for this difference are obvious, the most important
being that both powder and ordnance took a long time to manufac-
ture. Unlike other smaller stores, these could not be ordered and then
delivered in a couple of months. The Ordnance needed to know how
much it was going to receive so that it could plan. The durations
involved can be seen in the bill books which survive in the National
Archives at Kew. To take two examples: in April 1797 a bill was
allowed for 500 barrels of powder delivered by Edmund Hill. This
bill had been examined and approved on 22 March of that year.
However, the original warrant for the powder had been taken out in
April 1796. Thus it had taken eleven months for the powder to be
delivered. The second example is similar. Messrs Taylor and Co. had
their bill allowed on 27 June 1797, having had it passed on 26 March
1797 from a warrant of 5 May 1796.8
What were the terms of the contracts? Very few Ordnance con-
tracts actually survive in the records, and none for gunpowder have
been discovered. However, a record entitled ‘Heads of a contract to
be offered to each of the several Powder Makers in England’ has been
uncovered. Although not dated, this document is representative of
the type of contract signed by the powder merchants in the period
under discussion. It states that for every 100 lb barrel of powder, the
Ordnance would provide 105 lbs of pure saltpetre or 112 lbs of
grough [sic] (unrefined) saltpetre. Each barrel of powder submitted
was to be at least 75 per cent saltpetre. The merchants were to find
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their own sulphur and charcoal. No conditions are imposed concern-
ing the sulphur, but the charcoal was to be ‘made from black Dog -
wood, Alder or white willow properly charred in Common pits,
Potts or in cylinders’.9
Even when the gunpowder and, in fact, all stores had been deliv-
ered to the Ordnance, the merchants were not guaranteed payment.
Each article delivered, whether powder, ordnance, or even a small
nail, had to pass a proof test. This was to prove that the quality was
good enough for government service, or in the case of copper sheets,
nails, and so on, that they matched the pattern that the Ordnance
used. For nails, each merchant would have seen a sample at the
beginning of his contract showing him the pattern to which the arti-
cle needed to conform. If it failed proof, then the merchant was not
paid. It was the proofing system that allowed the Ordnance to guar-
antee a minimum standard for all articles it then supplied to the army
and navy. By the time of the Great Wars, the proof test for powder
con sisted of firing a projectile out of a mortar angled at 45 degrees.
Not only did the projectile have to fly at least 145 feet, but the pow-
der ‘supplied by the powder maker shall not be less than 19 parts in
20 of the range of the King’s powder’.10 Not all powder passed proof
and if it did not pass, the merchant was out of pocket, especially as
he had to pay a capital deposit for the saltpetre. This was not re -
turned if the powder failed.
This short description has shown the potential power that the
Ordnance had over all its contractors, although it was not always as
great as it would have liked. The small numbers of manufacturers of
both gunpowder and ordnance meant that it was sometimes easy for
the merchants to form a cartel against the Ordnance. This will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
State v. Private Manufacture
As we have seen, the vast majority of articles and stores that the
Ordnance required were provided by the private sector. The massive
300
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growth of this business can be seen in a quick perusal of the Ord -
nance Bill Books in the National Archives.11 However, gunpowder
was different. The Ordnance actually increased the proportion of
gun powder produced by the state as compared to the private sector.
This also applied to small arms and gun carriages, although these
will not be discussed here. The Ordnance never manufactured iron
ordnance (although it did produce brass ordnance at the Royal Brass
Foundry in Chatham). Why the state increased its manufacture is
open to debate, but it seems to have been for two main reasons: first,
to guarantee an adequate quantity and quality of powder; and sec-
ondly, because it was regarded as cheaper for the state to produce
powder.
As stated above, Jenny West has examined the gunpowder indus-
try in the middle of the eighteenth century and she describes the gov-
ernment takeover of the Faversham Powder Mills in 1759. She writes:
‘Purchase was undertaken with the aim of increasing government
stock at a time of exceptionally high demand from the armed servic-
es.’12 These were the first powder mills to be owned by the state, but
they were not the last. The Waltham Abbey Powder Mills were taken
over in 1787 and, after the outbreak of the wars, the Ordnance built a
smaller set of mills in Ballincollig, just outside Cork in Ireland. This
increase meant that by the end of the wars, the state was manufac-
turing about 70 per cent of the gunpowder needed by the armed
forces.
The importance of the private sector at the start of the wars can be
seen in the fact that at least 60 per cent, if not more, of the powder
issued to the Royal Navy at Upnor Castle in 1793 was merchant pow-
der. Three years into the wars, the figure was still around the 60 per
cent mark. Clearly the navy could not have fought without this pow-
der. Figures for Waltham Abbey alone give some idea of the increase
in state manufacture. When it was taken over in 1787, Waltham
Abbey produced around 6,000 barrels of powder. By 1809, this num-
ber had risen to 20,000 barrels and by 1813 had reached 22,400.13 This
was a rise of almost 300 per cent. To put these figures into some kind
301
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of perspective, the Select Committee on Finance’s 1817 report on the
Ordnance stated that the average amount of powder used in the last
few years of the wars was 80,000 barrels per year.14 Thus Waltham
Abbey alone produced more than a quarter of the powder needed in
one year. Figures for 1809 also show the importance of the state man-
ufactories: Waltham Abbey manufactured 20,055 barrels and Faver -
sham 16,568 barrels, making a total of 36,623 barrels. Over the same
twelve months the number of merchant barrels passing proof was
21,995.15
The two reasons suggested above for the increase in state produc-
tion will now be discussed in detail. First, the issue of quantity and
quality. As we have seen, the amount of powder supplied by the
Ordnance reached levels that were unprecedented at the time. Even
at these levels, at no stage does it appear that expeditions or cam-
paigns were delayed because of a lack of powder.16 Having said this,
the supply was not perfect. Fortunately, we have the vast majority of
records for Upnor Castle Magazine, which supplied the naval forces
at Chatham. One of the surviving record books shows which ships
were supplied with powder, how much they were given, and of what
type. Data extracted from these records suggests that in 1793, almost
30 per cent of the powder issued at Upnor was termed ‘old store’. As
gunpowder degrades in performance the older it gets, this powder
must have been particularly weak. ‘New merchant’ powder does not
appear to have started appearing in the magazines until 1796. Until
that time, the navy seems to have been issued with older types of
powder and new manufacture from state mills. The subsequent
increase in state manufacture must be seen in this light. By owning
their own mills the Ordnance could guarantee that there was a regu-
lar supply of powder at the start of every conflict. Because of the cap-
ital needed to run a powder mill and the cyclical nature of income
from powder, which will be discussed below, it took a number of
years for a private merchant to build up a regular supply.
There was, in fact, almost no state manufacture at all. According
to Sir William Congreve the Elder, the then prime minister, William
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Pitt, had intended to sell the Faversham Powder Mills in 1783 but
was persuaded not to by the Master-General, the Duke of Rich -
mond.17 As we have seen, four years later the Waltham Abbey Mills
were bought to add to Faversham.
The second reason for the state becoming more involved was
financial. Throughout the period under discussion, the Ordnance
tried not to waste public money. Congreve the Elder believed that by
increasing state manufacture, the Ordnance was actually saving
money. Although some of his figures must be treated with caution,
Congreve thought that all the increases and improvements had saved
the Ordnance more than a million pounds between 1789 and 1810.18
Congreve calculated that by manufacturing 407,408 barrels between
January 1789 and August 1810, the Ordnance had saved almost
£290,000, this being ‘the difference between what that number of bar-
rels cost manufacturing at the King’s mills, and the sum that would
have been paid if supplied by the merchants’.19 This is a not incon-
siderable amount of money. However, the savings may not have
been as large as Congreve suggested. Later in the document he val-
ues each barrel of powder at £5.20 However, in 1797 the merchants
were paid ‘only’ £2 a barrel for powder.21 This discrepancy would
make a big difference in Congreve’s numbers. However, it is still
apparent that the state could manufacture powder more cheaply per
barrel than the private sector.
How much money was available for the merchants? The incomes
of some of the manufacturers are staggering. In the two years 1812
and 1813, John Butts received over £64,000. This was income rather
than profit, but it is a substantial sum. Even some of the smaller
manu facturers were earning large amounts. For example, John Hall
earned over £15,000 and William Taylor more than £17,000.22 Al -
303
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though not directly comparable, in December 1797, Frederick Pigou
was paid £1,000 for 500 barrels which he had delivered to Purfleet
(the central Ordnance powder magazine), as we see from a contract
of 17 November 1796. Just three months later he was paid another
£1,000 for a contract dated 12 May 1797.23 These were both at £2 a
barrel. If time allowed, all the payments to the powder manufactur-
ers could be traced through the Ordnance Bill books which appear to
be complete. It can be seen that it was definitely advantageous for
merchants to remain on good terms with the Ordnance.
As stated above, before the merchant was paid, the powder he
supplied had to pass a proof test. Some sort of quality control was
required by the Ordnance on all articles that it contracted for, and
gunpowder was no exception. By the time of the Great Wars, a test
had been developed that involved firing a small amount (a couple of
ounces) of powder in a mortar and seeing how far the projectile flew.
In order to pass proof, the powder had to send the projectile at least
145 feet and to be no weaker than 19/20ths of the state-produced
powder.24 As stated, if the powder failed proof, then the merchant
was not paid. In Table 11.2, below, it can be seen that Hill’s powder
did not reach the minimum standard. This meant that the 253 whole
barrels of large grain powder that he submitted for proof were reject-
ed.25 Two months later Hill again has some of his powder rejected (51
out of 124 whole barrels). This time, Pigou suffered the same prob-
lem, with 325 of his 794 barrels being rejected at proof.26 If the pow-
der was rejected, then no payment was made, the deposit for the salt-
petre was lost, and the merchant had to collect the powder at his own
expense. It would have been worse before the wars. If the powder
did not reach the required standard, the whole batch would have
been rejected.27
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Table 10.1 Results of proof test of power manufactured between 
5 Apr. and 28 Dec. 1797
a Cylinder powder was a new type first introduced around 1787. It was sub-
stantially stronger than the traditional pit powder.
Source: TNA SUPP 5/118.
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Manufacturer Type Date of manu-
facture (1797)
How far it
fired (ft)
How far it fired
after 70 days left
in air (ft)
Faversham cylindera 21 Apr. 161 160
Waltham Abbey cylinder 25 Apr. 174 175
Waltham Abbey willow 6 May 150 153
Mr Pigou merchant 11 Apr. 162 156
Mr Hill merchant 6 Apr. 161 153
Mr Taylor merchant 13 Apr. 160 152
Messer Bridges merchant 9 Apr. 158 152
Messer Tayler merchant 5 Apr. 149 152
Faversham cylinder 26 Dec. 159 157
Waltham Abbey cylinder 26 Dec. 171 163
Waltham Abbey willow 29 Oct. 137 136
Messer Bridges merchant 2 Dec. 163 160
Mr Taylor merchant 14 Dec. 148 145
Messer Tayler merchant 21 Dec. 146 145
Mr Hill merchant 28 Dec. 145 117
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Table 10.2 Results of proof test of power manufactured between 
29 Oct. 1797 and 22 Nov. 1798
Source: TNA SUPP 5/118
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Manufacturer Type Date of manufac-
ture
How far it fired
(ft)
Faversham cylinder 2 Feb. 1798 158
Waltham Abbey cylinder 1 Mar. 1798 169
Waltham Abbey willow 29 Oct. 1797 139
Pigou merchant 27 Feb. 1798 156
Taylor merchant 24 Feb. 1798 148
Tayler merchant 24 Feb. 1798 147
Hill merchant 14 Feb. 1798 136
Faversham cylinder 22 Nov. 1798 165
Waltham Abbey cylinder 18 Nov. 1798 168
Waltham Abbey willow 14 Sept. 1798 137
Pigou merchant 20 Nov. 1798 154
Tayler merchant 20 Nov. 1798 151
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Because of the comparison with state-produced powder, the mer-
chants sometimes felt that the Ordnance deliberately loaded the die
against them. A case in point occurred in December 1798, when the
powder merchants (as a group) wrote to the Board complaining that
when testing their power, the Ordnance was not comparing like with
like. In a letter dated 24 December, Congreve was adamant that this
was not the case and rebutted the claims of the merchants.28 This let-
ter from Congreve is interesting because although it only gives the
government side of the story, it does show that the two sectors were
in competition, even when the nation was at war. Unfortunately, the
letter from the merchants to the Board has not survived, but its tone
can be inferred from Congreve’s reply.
The merchants’ first complaint was that the government was
deliberately manufacturing powder that was stronger than usual to
use in the comparison proof tests. In fact, according to the Assistant
Firemaster of the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich, the powder used in
the tests was actually in a ‘defective’ state. The second issue raised
was pit powder v. cylinder powder. Congreve wrote:
I dare say the Powder Merchants will few of them deny hav-
ing set up Iron Cylinders to char wood for their manufactories,
and they must be convinced that the Ordnance does not wish
them to make their powder with any particular sort of coal, if
they wish it, nay I trust them so to do, and not suffer the King’s
Mills to continue to make bad Powder merely to favor [sic] the
Merchants, the difference of price of Cylinder Charcoal and of
common pit, being too trifling to afford any objection to the
general use of the Cylinder.
The merchants were also after a price rise. They claimed that they
should be paid more because of the waste of ingredients involved in
the manufacturing process. Congreve claimed that this waste was
‘evidently not greater now than when the Merchants received only 30
shillings per barrel’. They were, of course, receiving 40 shillings at the
time the letter was written.
Finally, Congreve continued to claim that state manufacture was
cheaper than merchant, and he said that he was ‘sincerely pleased’
15
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that the people who had stated that the state could not produce pow-
der for less than £10 a barrel had been proved wrong. This case is
interesting because it shows the powder merchants working togeth-
er as a group against the Ordnance as well as the pressures on them.
They would be substantially out of pocket if their powder failed
proof.
It was not only the powder merchants who formed cartels against
the Ordnance. The manufacturers of iron ordnance did the same. The
difference here was that because the state did not produce any iron
ordnance of its own, the iron makers were in an even stronger posi-
tion than the powder merchants. Some correspondence is worth
quoting in full. Three manufacturers, Walkers, Carron, and Graham
and Son, wrote to the Secretary of the Board on 27 July 1809 stating
that they had received the Board’s instruction that ‘they expect the
price of Carronades will be reduced to £24 per ton . . . on which we
beg leave to observe, that we are willing to take £26 per ton for all
Carronades the Honourable Board may be pleased to order in
future’. This letter was forwarded to General Blomefield, Inspector of
Artillery, on 18 August and he replied on 21 August that ‘in conse-
quence of the present high price of Iron and other causes, I beg to
state that such a temporary advance does not appear unreasonable,
but subject to a proportionate abatement, should those causes cease
to operate’. On 23 August, Blomefield was informed that the gun-
founders had been ‘granted the advance of price’.29 The Com mis sion -
ers of Military Enquiry had some concerns about this situation. In
their words:
we see ground of objection to the mode of granting it: it has no
reference to the principle of competition; and the concert
between the gun-founders, which it sanctions, tends rather to
subject the Board of Ordnance on future occasions, if not on
this, to the effects of combination . . . A proportionate abate-
ment is provided for whenever the causes which justify the
advance shall cease to operate. It is stated to be the duty of the
Surveyor General, to notice such fluctuations in the market
prices; but it is not probable that he can be as quicksighted in
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discovering favourable changes, as the contractor will be in
pointing out those of an opposite tendency.30
In other words, the advantage in this situation was with the mer-
chants. Because they were dealing only with the price of one com-
modity, they could read market trends more quickly than the Sur -
veyor General, who not only had to look at many articles, but also
had other Ordnance-related work to carry out. As shown above, in
the case of gunpowder manufacture the impact of this form of cartel
was mitigated by the state manufacturing its own powder.
Relations in War and Peace
Gunpowder, by its very nature, was more in demand under condi-
tions of war than in peacetime. In her conclusion, Jenny West writes:
‘In war there was high demand, contracts, and full employment at
the mills. In peace there were few if any contracts as requirements for
basic defence and military exercise and training were comparatively
low.’31 Although she was writing about the mid-eighteenth century,
the same was true for the period of the Great Wars and the peace that
followed. When Ordnance contracts dried up, the little remaining
demand for powder (for mining, hunting, and so on) did not produce
the same large incomes that the merchants had been used to during
the war years. Butts’s £64,000 over two years may have been at the
top end of the scale, but even £10,000 to £15,000 was not a trifling
income for the period. Although West also discusses this, it is worth
reiterating here that unlike, for example, iron founders, who could
produce other articles at their works as well as iron ordnance, pow-
der manufacturers were essentially one-trade merchants. Some evi-
dence exists that they also produced empty barrels, but this did not
give them anywhere near the same income as powder. At this stage,
we should also remember the capital investment required to build
the mills in the first place. Congreve stated that up to the end of 1810,
Faversham and Waltham Abbey had cost the Ordnance a total of
£45,622 12s. 4d., this being ‘the whole amount expended in the origi-
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nal cost, in extensions of the works, in repairs, and improvements’.32
Although these were bigger than the private mills, they show the
costs involved (and this does not include the materials such as sul-
phur and charcoal which the merchants had to source themselves).
Faversham alone had cost the Ordnance £5,682 in 1759.33
Another, obvious, problem in peacetime was that the Ordnance
stores were not used up as quickly (if at all) as in wartime. According
to the 1817 Select Committee on Finance, there were 232,000 barrels
of serviceable and 62,000 of doubtful or condemned powder in store
at the time of writing.34 As stated above, the yearly expenditure of
powder was estimated at 80,000 so there was already almost three
years’ supply, at war-time levels, with no additional manufacture.
Once it became clear that the wars were not going to reignite, the
Ordnance was left wondering what to do with all these stores. Its
solution, as at the end of every war, was to sell off the excess. As far
as the powder merchants were concerned, this meant that not only
were they not being given new contracts, but the market was being
flooded with old powder, some of which they themselves had man-
ufactured in the first place! To put it mildly, this was not a happy sit-
uation for them. On 16 November 1818 they put their complaints into
words in a memorial to the Lords of the Treasury. The discussion that
follows will be based on this memorial.35
They opened their complaint with the following statement con-
cerning ‘the alarming injury we are sustaining by the very peculiar
contract Mr. Samuel has been allowed to accomplish with the hon-
ourable Board of Ordnance, for the purchase of certain quantities of
gunpowder’. They continued:
We are persuaded it has never been the wish or intention of
either your Lordships, or that honourable Board, to set up and
uphold an individual, perfectly unconnected with the manu-
facture of an article, in opposition to the fair and legitimate
interest of the manufacturers themselves; and that it only
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requires an explanation from them of such an effect, to induce
your Lordships to prevent such injurious contracts in future.
Their main complaints can be summarized as follows:
● Samuels could supply the home and foreign markets at lower
prices as gunpowder was delivered to Purfleet, Portsmouth,
Plymouth, and Falmouth, saving on freight and carriage costs.
● The powder manufacturers had spent large sums of money on
enlarging their own works and the peacetime sales would have
been some reimbursement for these.
● Their contract had specified that all other sales would be sus-
pended.
● Even with the advantages above, Samuels had not been able to
sell much more than 10,000 barrels. They stated: ‘What, my Lords,
is to be inferred . . . [is] that in periods of peace, the demand is too
trifling; and against trivial demand, it is in vain to press extended
sales.’
● The Board had previously extracted the saltpetre at the end of
the wars, rather than selling the powder itself. The merchants
thought that this would actually bring Treasury coffers more
money than selling the powder itself because ‘purchasers of petre
on a much more extended scale, are to be found amongst other
traders than amongst the manufacturers of gunpowder’.
● They feared that they would have to lay off workers, and that
those they laid off might take out their frustrations on the manu-
factories by burning them down, ‘and thereby occasion the
destruction of our very valuable machinery; the loss of which
must wholly fall on ourselves, as it is a species of property no
office will insure’.
● It would be difficult to get experienced workmen back quickly if
people were laid off.
● They feared damage to buildings if they were not used for a long
period of time. The buildings would have to be repaired before
they could be used for manufacturing powder again.
On the last two points, the merchants commented: ‘to which we
might add, we hope not presumptuously, the policy of upholding a
species of manufacture which can, in periods of sudden demand, fur-
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nish important aid to the Government in their military and naval
operations.’ The merchants were clearly worried about their profits
in peacetime and their last comment was pointing out that their arti-
cle was indispensable to the military. As argued above, the Ordnance
had negated this point partly by increasing the amount of state man-
ufacture and thus guaranteeing a reasonable stock at the start of any
future conflict.
The Ordnance responded on 27 January 1819. Again, their points
may be summarized as follows:
● It was government policy to ‘lessen the great accumulation of
stores left by the sudden conclusion of the war’. The sales could
also be used as credit on Ordnance estimates, and with the sale of
perishable stores, some storehouses, such as floating magazines,
could be dismantled, thus saving the cost of maintaining them as
well.
● Thus the Ordnance felt it best to sell as much as possible, even if
it was at a lower cost than may have been desirable, especially as
a number of the stores were of a ‘perishable nature’.
● Samuels had agreed to buy many stores, not just gunpowder,
and on this the Board wished to inform the Lords of the Treasury
of ‘the great advantage gained . . . of disposing of a number of
other stores in immense quantities, which, by the common
method of trusting to the periodical sales (even though attended
with the advantage of public competition) it might have taken
years to accomplish’.
● The Ordnance also contended that ‘upon the whole, they have
been good stewards to the public (unless the gunpowder mer-
chants alone are to be considered as the public) in disposing of its
general property (all circumstances considered) to the best advan-
tage’.
● Even if the powder merchants had bought the powder, they
would still have had to lay off workers as they were selling pow-
der that had already been manufactured.
● The Board sold all stores at the place where they were stored—
there was no attempt to save Samuel the cost of freight.
● As for the merchants’ works, ‘[they] had been enlarged at a great
expense, in order to supply the Government. But was this to serve
the Government or themselves? And if the latter, have they not
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succeeded? Most of them (and the Board rejoice at it) have
acquired fortunes by their exertions in the service of the public;
but this is at least not a reason why they should continue to make
them at the expense of that public.’
● As for the workmen, the Ordnance pointed out that it had also
had to lay off thousands of its own workers and noted that ‘many,
in other trades at least, who have been loudest in their complaints
of Government for bringing the public means to account, have
had the liberality to set a stigma upon all who came into the
Ordnance employ, and have resolved never to give them work
when turned adrift.’
● Although the Master-General and Board ‘deny the expediency
of yielding to any part of the Memorial itself’, they suspended all
sales of powder for three years.
The conclusions to draw from these points are self evident, but
they demonstrate the relations between the powder merchants (and
other merchants, for that matter) and the Ordnance. They can be
summed up thus: the Ordnance wanted to save the public purse
money and the merchants wanted that money to go to them.
Conclusion
This essay has shown how relations between gunpowder merchants
and the Office of Ordnance developed during the period in and
around the Great Wars of 1793 to 1815. Relations were not always
cordial because of the differing aims and objectives of both sides, but
they did not break down either. This essay has also shown how the
powder merchants came together as a group to try to force the
Ordnance to adopt their way of thinking. They clearly believed that
they had more power together than as individuals. They were not
alone in this; the manufacturers of iron ordnance did the same thing
during the wars. We have seen that they were, in fact, able to force
the hand of the Ordnance at times: the ordnance manufacturers dur-
ing the wars and the powder merchants, to a lesser extent, after the
wars. The wars had also made the powder merchants massive prof-
its and some of the numbers involved are staggering. These, howev-
er, were profits made under wartime conditions. Once peace broke
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out across the Continent of Europe, there was no market for gun-
powder and the profits dried up almost overnight.
This essay has outlined the importance of the private sector to the
British war effort. Even with the expansion in state manufacture,
there was still a need for private merchants. In addition, two of the
three components of the powder, sulphur and saltpetre, had to be
imported into Britain in the hulls of private ships. The networks,
links, and relationships between the state and private sectors de -
scribed in this paper demonstrate that one could not survive without
the other. If any of the chains had broken at any stage, the system
would have collapsed and the Royal Navy and British Army would
not have been able successfully to prosecute the conflict. One aspect
that has not been discussed here is the amount of weaponry that the
British were able to send their Continental allies over the twenty-five
years of conflict.36
Throughout the wars, the Ordnance had guaranteed the supply of
a critical store while improving its quality (something which has not
been discussed in any detail in this essay). The Ordnance had tried,
arguably successfully, to save public money while some of the mer-
chants managed to acquire fortunes.
36 See John Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars
with France, 1793–1815 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) for a study of this in action.
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